Fear of a two-speed monetary union: what does a basic correlation scatter plot tell us? by Pentecôte, Jean-Sébastien
Fear of a two-speed monetary union: what does a basic
correlation scatter plot tell us?
Jean-Se´bastien Pentecoˆte
To cite this version:
Jean-Se´bastien Pentecoˆte. Fear of a two-speed monetary union: what does a basic correlation
scatter plot tell us?. CREM Working Paper WP 2012-18. 2013. <halshs-00916947>
HAL Id: halshs-00916947
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00916947
Submitted on 11 Dec 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
W
o
r
k
in
g
 P
a
p
e
r
U
n
iv
e
rs
it
y 
o
f 
R
e
n
n
e
s 
1
U
n
iv
e
rs
it
y 
o
f 
C
a
e
n
 
Fear of a two-speed monetary union: 
what does a basic correlaion scater 
plot tell us? 
 
Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte
University of Rennes 1 - CREM, (UMR 6211 CNRS) 
March 2012 - WP 2012-18
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management
Center for Research in Economics and Management
1 
 
Fear of a two-speed monetary union: what does a basic correlation scatter plot tell us? 
 
Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte 
CREM UMR-CNRS 6211, University of Rennes I 
 
This version, March 2012 
 
 
Abstract 
 
I extend the Bayoumi-Eichengreen (1993) approach by extracting new information from a 
scatter plot of correlation coefficients between shocks in order to better visualize how far a 
given country is from a monetary union. Indexes of distance and relative strength can be 
derived from either a nonlinear or a linear combination of correlations in connexion with 
distinct welfare loss functions. Using quarterly data on ten countries over 1979:I-2011:IV, 
shocks have become more symmetric within, but also outside, the euro area. Despite less 
asymmetry in shock asymmetry since 1999, new statistical tests support the idea of a two-
speed EMU. 
 
JEL codes: F33, F36, D6, E2  
 
Keywords: monetary union, euro, shock asymmetry, distance, VAR identification. 
 
Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte, CREM–UMR CNRS 6211, Department of Economics, University of Rennes 1, 7 
place Hoche, CS 86514, 35065 Rennes Cedex, France. Tel: (33) 2 23 23 35 56. Fax: (33) 2 23 23 35 99. Email: 
jpenteco@univ-rennes1.fr  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The ongoing marathon for rescuing countries incurring banking and/or sovereign debt 
crises is threatening cohesion amid the Member States of the European Union. Of particular 
concern is the rising risk that (at least) one of its members shall leave the euro, possibly 
ending in a breakup of the European Monetary Union (EMU).  In February 2012, Citigroup 
has revised the probability of a Greek exit from 25-30% to 50% over the next eighteen 
months (see Buiter and Rahbari, 2012).  
Current worries about a two-speed Europe echoes dramatically with the adjustment 
problem faced by the European Monetary System following the shock of the German 
monetary reunification two decades ago. This has led several authors, among which Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1993), to revisit the issue of shock asymmetry in a monetary union (De 
Haan et al. (2008) for an overview). Loosing exchange rate flexibility as an adjustment tool to 
macroeconomic disequilibria may be costly according to Mundell’s view on optimal currency 
areas (Dellas and Tavlas, 2009). It will be so for a country subject to specific, rather than 
common, shocks in the absence of labour mobility and/or wage-price flexibility.  
A widely used empirical strategy to tackle this issue consists in estimating the correlation 
coefficients of the structural shocks between a given country and the monetary union itself. 
The more correlated shocks are, the less costly should be stabilization policies for the whole 
union as initially argued by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (o.p.). The latter authors explain how 
to get the series of macroeconomic shocks from the Blanchard and Quah (1989) identification 
procedure of a two-dimensional vector-autoregressive process. Within the basic aggregate 
demand-aggregate supply framework, the long-run responses of output and prices allow one 
to distinguish shocks from the supply side to those from demand in a given country. 
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Computation of correlation coefficients between domestic and foreign shocks of a given type 
finally leads to a simple scatter plot of the stochastic asymmetry. 
The aim of this paper is to show how the information provided by such a box diagram can 
be synthesised into useful indexes in order to better visualize how far a given country is from 
a monetary union. The first one gives a direct measure of the distance to the (best) fully 
symmetric case. That index may result from either a nonlinear vector decomposition or a 
linear combination of the correlation coefficients, depending on the underlying welfare loss 
function being considered. The second index measures the relative strength of asymmetry in 
terms of supply and demand shocks. Again, the nonlinear and linear approaches may imply 
different rankings within a set of countries against the monetary union. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows how the distance and relative strength 
indexes can be build from the scatter plot of the correlated supply and demand shocks. Using 
quarterly data on ten euro and non-euro countries over 1979:I-2011:IV, section 3 providence 
new empirical evidence on the core-periphery view of EMU given the statistical properties of 
the distance and relative strength indexes. New tests support the idea of a two-speed Europe 
even since EMU. Furthermore shocks have become more symmetric within but also outside 
the euro area. 
 
2. A visual inspection of shock asymmetry through the ‘correlation box’ 
 
Graphically, these correlations lie somewhere in the square box delimited by the dashed 
line as depicted on Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1: The correlation box and distance to a symmetric monetary union 
 
By construction, correlation coefficients between either supply (ρs) or demand shocks (ρd) 
take their values in the [-1,1] interval. Point S at the upper right corner corresponds to the 
fully symmetric case between any candidate member and the reference group (or country) of 
the single currency area. At the opposite, the lower left point A reflects complete asymmetric 
shocks, in terms of demand as well as in terms of supply. In the core-periphery view of 
monetary unions popularized by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 1994), the closer the 
candidate country to point S is, the lower should be the cost of joining the single currency 
since adjustments by a common policy should be easier.  
It is thus interesting to translate these correlations into a more direct and synthetic measure 
of distance to EMU. A related issue is the assessment of the relative strength of asymmetries 
from the demand or the supply sides. 
B1 
B2 
1
A 
-1 1 
S 
ρd 
ρs 
-1 
O
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2.1. Distance and welfare loss from shock asymmetry 
 
From the correlation box in figure 1, there are two main ways to compute distance to a 
perfectly symmetric monetary union. The first one is a standard Euclidean measure which 
assumes a non-linear combination of the two pair-wise correlation coefficients, whereas the 
second one rests upon a basic summation of sources of stochastic asymmetry.  
The first approach can be derived from a vector representation inside the correlation box1. 
The resulting index is based on the Euclidean measure of distance of the candidate country i 
(illustrated by the point Ci on figure 1) from the (best) benchmark case (S) of fully symmetric 
shocks. The former equals the norm of vector S. This quantity is then normalized by the 
maximum distance from the (worst) completely asymmetric situation (A) relative to the ideal 
locus S. To sum up, the Euclidean distance index DE is defined as: 
 
( ) ( )
22
11 22 −+−
==
ii
i
C
d
C
siC
E
AS
SC
D
ρρ
. (1) 
 
 By construction, the Euclidean distance index lies in the [0,1] range. When DE is zero, 
shocks in candidate country i are fully synchronized with those in the targeted monetary 
union. Therefore, both economies will be subject to common (symmetric) shocks only. By 
contrast, complete asymmetry holds when DE is equal unity so that the candidate country is 
located on point A on figure 1. In that case, economies are hit by purely idiosyncratic demand 
as well as supply shocks. Over time, country Ci will be more synchronized with the monetary 
union if DE decreases.   
                                                 
1
 Correlation coefficients can receive a geometric interpretation themselves (see Rodgers et al. (1998)). 
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 Such a Euclidean metric of distance in terms of stochastic asymmetries can be related to 
the underlying loss function of the monetary authorities. The former is indeed of the quadratic 
form. It further assumes that costly asymmetries receive equal weights no matter they 
originate from the production or the consumption sides. Imperfectly correlated shocks 
influence the implicit social cost function non-linearly. This implies circular indifference 
curves, all centered on the first best point S. From figure 1 above, this means that any point 
like C1 or C2 on a given indifference curve would be associated to the same level of welfare 
cost. Even though quadratic loss functions are often used to study the behavior of monetary 
authorities, one may consider an alternative, and more straightforward, index of distance in 
terms of stochastic asymmetries. 
 Another way of computing distance to what is commonly viewed as the first best 
symmetric monetary union (S) consists simply in the summation of the estimated correlations 
of demand and supply shocks between a given country i and the monetary union. Resorting to 
normalization as done as before, the competing linear metric of distance DL is given by the 
formula: 
 
( )
4
2 ii Cd
C
s
LD
ρρ +−
= .  (2) 
 
Like the above Euclidean measure, we provide a linear distance index whose values lie in 
the [0,1] range. Furthermore, it is build so as to receive the same interpretation as the DE 
metric. For a given candidate or member country i, DL is nil when its supply and demand 
shocks are perfectly synchronized to those of the reference country, thereby leading point Ci 
to match with S. At the opposite, the linear distance index takes its maximum value in the 
event of perfectly negative correlations in terms of both demand and supply disturbances. As 
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before, any decline in DL means a move towards the (symmetric) core of the monetary union. 
Thus, Ci would get closer to S within the correlation box on figure 1.  
 The shape of the indifference curves resulting from formula (2) contrasts sharply with that 
implied by the Euclidean measure of distance (1). These indifference curves are now 
illustrated by diagonal lines which are orthogonal to the first secant in the ( )ds ρρ ,  space like 
the one passing through the points C1 and C2 on figure 1. 
 There are very particular circumstances under which the Euclidean and the linear metrics 
deliver the same values. This is illustrated here by any point on the first secant like F where 
the corresponding diagonal orthogonal to the secant (AS) is tangent to the circle centered on S. 
Tangency ensures that the above formulas (1) and (2) are strictly equivalent. Notice however 
that a country located at F will now be viewed as being farther from the symmetric core of the 
monetary union (S) (and its entry more costly) than any country on C1 (or C2) because 
1C
L
F
L DD > . As a result, conclusions may differ in terms of the core-periphery view of the 
single currency area depending on whether the Euclidean distance DE or the linear metric DL 
is used. It will be even more so if at least one of the two correlation coefficients is reaching 
one of its bounds, placing the country at the frontier of the correlation box (like B1 or B2 on 
figure 1). 
 Another interesting case is when two accession countries may exhibit a so-called “reverse 
asymmetry”. This is illustrated by countries C1 and C2 on figure 1 where 12 Cd
C
s ρρ =
 
and 
12 C
s
C
d ρρ = .  Whatever the index used, they are equidistant to the core of the monetary but
2,12,1 C
E
C
L DD > . Thus, switching for one index to another will yield a simple rescaling of 
distance without modifying the core-periphery view of the currency area in terms of welfare. 
 These comparisons raise an important issue on the welfare consequences of the entry to 
monetary union. There is indeed no consensus about the relevant way the costs from various 
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types of shock asymmetries should be weighted in the social loss function. At the theoretical 
level, it remains unclear if shocks from the real supply side as well as from the (nominal and 
real) demand sector have to be accounted for modeling the cost of joining a monetary union.  
 For example Nolan (2002) argues that only shocks to real output really matter for 
comparing the incurred welfare losses under alternative monetary regimes. According to this 
author, there is a decreasing nonlinear relationship between co-movements in supply shocks 
and output losses, given the weight of each member in the union. By contrast, Lane (2000) 
finds that the welfare consequences of asymmetric demand shocks in a currency union 
typically depend on the patterns of economic integration. In his view, welfare losses are more 
sensitive to the choice of the exchange rate regime when economies are subject to “purely 
asymmetric” or “purely idiosyncratic” demand shocks than when they are hit by productivity 
shocks. 
 Lane’s findings are however challenged by Roisland and Torvik (2003) who study the 
welfare consequences of shocks asymmetry in the case of a commitment to inflation targeting 
by central banks under alternative monetary regimes. They show that the more negatively 
correlated supply shocks are, the larger the benefit from joining the monetary union. 
Idiosyncratic supply shocks lead to opposite adjustments in the nominal exchange rate so that 
greater asymmetry in production should be an additional incentive for one country to enter the 
monetary union. These conclusions typically conflict with the conventional wisdom about 
shock asymmetry - from either the demand or the supply side - as preventing a given currency 
area from being optimal.  
 It remains that the origin of stochastic asymmetry can itself be a matter of concern for 
monetary unification. One may thus wish to compare the magnitude of shocks correlations.   
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2.2. The relative strength of shock asymmetry 
 
  A second index is constructed under each of the two previous approaches in order to 
assess the relative intensity of shock asymmetries. 
 According to the trigonometric decomposition underlying the Euclidean distance, the 
related asymmetry index AE can be expressed as: 
 
[ ]1,1,
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ρ
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 In a fully symmetric monetary union (point S on figure 1), unit correlations between 
shocks from the supply and the demand sides imply 
4
arctan
pi
ρ
ρ
=





S
s
S
d
. Thus, a given country i 
can belong to one of the three following cases: 
a) First, it can be located somewhere below the 45° line [AS] in the “correlation box” like 
point C1 in the above figure 1. This signals greater asymmetry from the demand side than 
from the supply side. Since ρd is lower than ρs,, AE takes negative values in the [-1,0[ 
range.  
b) Second, it can be situated somewhere above [AS] like point C2. Country i will thus exhibit 
stronger asymmetry in terms of supply than in terms of demand (relative to the monetary 
union itself). The asymmetry index AE will be positive in the ]0,1] interval. 
c) Third and finally, there may be exactly the same level of asymmetry in terms of demand 
and supply shocks, thus implying 0=EA  everywhere on the segment [AS]. 
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 Given the correlation box, the AE index is build in order to have the three following 
properties2: 
• it is nil on the diagonal line [AS] since supply and demand shocks are equally 
correlated which corresponds here to the benchmark case; 
• in absolute terms, AE increases as the country moves away from [AS] and decreases as 
it goes closer to that benchmark diagonal line;  
• it takes extreme values when the two correlation coefficients are of the same 
magnitude but of opposite signs such that AE=1 on ]OB1] and AE=-1 on ]OB2]. 
 
 As before, let us assume that country 1 is situated on C1 while country 2 lies on C2. They 
are indeed at equal distance to the fully symmetric monetary union according to index DE but 
they exhibit contrasting patterns in terms of shock asymmetry as revealed by index AE. 
Heterogeneity arises mostly from the supply side in country 1, while specific demand shocks 
dominate in country 2. As shown on figure 1, the two new indices based on shock correlations 
can be used to identify countries belonging to the core or to the periphery of a fully symmetric 
monetary union.  
 This calls for some words of caution about the exact meaning of the index of relative 
strength of asymmetry AE. What matters is the angle made by the vector starting from the 
origin O and ending at Ci for a given country i with respect to the vector  ( resp.)  above 
(below resp.) [B1B2]. It follows that two countries will have the same value for AE if they are 
belonging to the same semi-diagonal starting from O perpendicular to [AS]. From this logic, 
  equals   on figure 1. 
                                                 
2
 Notice that  ! " #
$%&#'
. 
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Alternatively, one may consider a measure of the relative discrepancy of shock asymmetry 
through a linear combination the correlation coefficients in terms of supply and demand. 
Formally, this gives rise to the new index: 
 
.
2
ii C
s
C
d
LA
ρρ −
=
 
 (4) 
 
AL is intended to fulfil the first two properties of its AE alternative. Thus, it equals zero 
when the candidate country exhibit the same size of stochastic asymmetry from the supply 
and the demand sides, ie along the diagonal [AS] on figure 1. Index AL is strictly positive for 
any point above [AS] like C1 on figure 1, while it is negative for any locus below that line like 
C2.  
There is significant departure of the AL index from its AE counterpart. According to 
equation (4), all countries on a given segment parallel to [AS] are now characterized by the 
same value for AL. Instead, these will differ markedly by their AE metric. Intuitively, the 
absolute value of AL is higher, the further is the representative point Ci away from the 
diagonal [AS], that is away from points A and S simultaneously. The maximum value of the 
AL index is unity when the country is located on the upper left corner of the correlation box 
(B1), while it reaches its minimum of minus one when located on the bottom right corner on 
figure 1 (B2). As regards the AE index, it is maximum (minimum respectively) on the whole 
segment ]OB1] (]OB2] respectively). 
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3. Is there still a two-speed euro area? 
 
The following section discusses the usefulness of these new indexes in the wake of the 
process to European monetary unification (EMU). First, I present the data and the VAR 
identification of shocks. Second, I discuss the results. 
 
3.1. Data and the VAR identification of shocks 
 
The dataset is made of quarterly observations of the consumer price and the gross domestic 
product indexes (base 100=2005) over 1979:I-2011:IV This coincides with the launch of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism as the interim monetary regime before EMU. I consider seven 
founder member countries of the euro area (Austria, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain) together with Greece and two major non-euro countries, namely the UK 
and the USA for comparison purposes. Seasonally adjusted data come from Eurostat, except 
Greece for which OECD data are used. 
In line with Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
approach is applied in four steps: first, a first-order log-difference VAR(1) is fitted for each 
country with Germany taken as the reference country for the EMU; second, the identification 
of supply and demand shocks is achieved through Blanchard and Quah’s (1989) 
decomposition, assuming long-run neutrality of demand shocks on output; third, the 
correlation coefficients of shocks are computed; fourth and finally, the estimated correlations 
allow to build the indexes of distance and of relative strength of stochastic asymmetries 
presented in the previous section.  
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The reduced form of the price-output dynamics in a given country is described by the 
following p-order bivariate DSVAR(p) process in the matrix form: 
 
t
p
i
t
i
it L εzAz +=∑
=1
 (5) 
 
Here ( ) ( )( )′−−= ttt pLyL 1,1z  is the vector of the (first log-difference) of output and the 
(first log-difference) of the price level in some period t. L is the lag operator. The VAR 
residuals εt are white noise processes with covariance matrix εΣ .  
Provided that the VAR (p) is invertible, the corresponding VMA(∞) form is given by: 
 
t
i
p
i
it L εAIz
1
1
2
−
=






−= ∑ . (6) 
 
with I2 the conformable identity matrix. In a second step, an identification procedure is used 
to derive the (“structural”) innovations from the residuals after the estimation of the VAR.  
According first to BQ (1989), the decomposition of εΣ
 
yields the matrix CBQ that satisfies: 
 
 
'
BQBQCCΣ =ε  (7) 
 
The VAR residuals are then a linear combination of the structural innovations:  
 
.
,
,
, 
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η
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CηCε
 (8) 
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with P
tBQ ,
η   the “permanent” (aggregate supply) and T
tBQ ,
η  the  transitory (aggregate demand) 
disturbances, respectively. 
BQ’s (1989) identification constraints imply: 
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  (9) 
 
The first condition in (5) requires uncorrelated innovations with equal (unit) variances. The 
second condition implies that surprises from the demand side leave the natural level of output 
unchanged. This results from a Cholesky decomposition of the long-run impact matrix.  
This identification step plays a crucial role if one is interested in, like BE, the correlation 
between foreign and domestic – either permanent or transitory – shocks to gauge the 
suitability of a currency area among any country pair. 
 
3.2. The mixed evidence of a two-speed EMU 
 
Two sub-periods are distinguished: the pre-EMU phase ends in 1998:IV (just before the 
launch of the euro), while the EMU phase prevails thereafter. 
First of all, it is useful to have a look at the estimated shock asymmetry in the correlation 
box as given in figure 2 below. 
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 A 
 
Note: AT: Austria, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece; IT: Italy, NL: 
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SP: Spain, UK: United Kingdom, US: United 
States. 
 
Figure 2. Empirical evidence of shock asymmetry with respect to Germany 
 
Like the previous studies, raw estimated correlation coefficients are reported here3. The 
pre-EMU phase is characterized by two distinct groups of countries in terms of shock 
comovements. On one hand, Austria, France, and Italy the highest correlations of demand 
shocks with respect to the German ones. Only is Austria lying almost on the 45° line (passing 
through the extreme cases A and S as in figure 1), while synchronization in terms of demand 
shocks is pretty much lower in the French and Italian cases. Like these two countries, Greece 
                                                 
3
 As discussed by Zimmermann et al. (2003), bias in the first-order moment has hump-shaped pattern and is 
maximal when 23,5 " 1 √3⁄ . However, it can be neglected here given the quite large samples at hand. 
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also belongs to the less distant group to Germany in terms of shock asymmetry. On the other 
hand, aggregate disturbances in the remaining European countries (Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain like the UK) are less synchronized with their German counterpart than those hitting the 
United States before the euro. This finding supports the idea of a core-periphery view of the 
EMU as famously developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). 
Turning now to the EMU phase, a striking feature is the general movement towards the 
upper right corner of the correlation box, thus meaning a noticeable move towards more 
symmetric demand as well as supply shocks with respect to Germany. The previous group of 
core countries is joined by the Netherlands. Shocks are, by far, more correlated than before 
EMU in Finland and Spain. By contrast, signs of improvement are more modest in Portugal 
than in the United Kingdom or even in the US. Unlike the euro Member States, the two latter 
countries exhibit the strongest but diametrically opposed departures to the 45-degree line. 
With the noticeable exception of Greece, there is some convincing evidence of convergence 
of the EMU countries to a more homogeneous set of countries. It remains however that shock 
asymmetry has not completely disappeared since all the point estimates of correlation 
coefficients are below 0.7. 
Next, we compute the indexes of distance and those of relative strength of stochastic 
asymmetry. Full results are reported on table 1 (next page). Beyond these point estimates, one 
may be interested in their statistical relevance. This leads to study the statistical properties of 
DE and AE like those of DL and AL. 
To this end, let Zs and Zd be the respective Fisher’s Z transformations of parameters ρs and 
ρd, as given by the general formula:  
 
.
1
1ln
2
1
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
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−
+
=
k
k
kZ ρ
ρ
 
(10) 
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The Z statistics are asymptotically normally distributed with mean zero and variance equal 
to 
%
;<=
 given the sample size T (disregarding potential bias in the variance as stressed by 
Zimmerman et al., 2003). Assuming independence between these two correlation coefficients 
for a given country (as assumed from the identification step of the vector autoregression), the 
test statistics (Zd+Zs) and (Zd–Zs) are also white Gaussian random variables with variance >;<=.  
The statistical distributions of the indexes of distance like those of relative asymmetry are 
not so obvious. However a test for equal symmetry of supply and demand shocks (AE or L=0) 
amounts to test for 0=− ii Cs
C
d ρρ . This can be seen from equation (3) (rearranged according to 
footnote 1) and equation (4) in the previous section. From what precedes, Fisher’s Z 
transformation (5) is diverging when shocks tend to be perfectly correlated, thus preventing 
from a formal test for zero distance to fully symmetry.   
Knowing this, five statistical tests have been performed in order to check for the following 
null: a) a zero coefficient of correlation between shocks under each sub-period; b) unchanged 
shock asymmetry before and after EMU; c) no change in distance following the switch to 
EMU in 1999; d) shock asymmetry of equal size from both the supply and the demand sides; 
e) no change in the relative size of shock asymmetry since 1999. 
As summarized in table 1, the first test confirms the visual inspection from the correlation 
box in figure 2. Two groups of countries now emerge clearly in terms of correlation between 
supply shocks before EMU: it is positive and statistically significant in Austria, France, 
Greece, and Italy only. Like Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), there is a less clear-cut 
distinction between the core and the periphery in Europe from the demand side. Furthermore, 
rejections of the null of non-correlated shocks are becoming seldom during the EMU period. 
However, this is observed for euro as well as non-euro economies. It is thus hard to relate 
these findings to a specific euro effect.  
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Table 1. Correlation of shocks from structural VARS and distance to full symmetry. 
Index Period 
Euro-members Non-euro 
members 
Austria Finland France Greece Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK USA 
Correlation between 
Supply Shocks ρs 
Pre-EMU 0.36 -0.09a 0.28 0.28 0.28 -0.02a -0.02a -0.04a 0.06a 0.09a 
EMU 0.56b 0.52 0.69 0.149a,b 0.64b 0.58 0.20a,b 0.51 0.45b 0.34b 
Correlation between 
Demand Shocks  ρd 
Pre-EMU 0.37 0.24 0.15a 0.207a 0.18a 0.04a 0.31 0.20a -0.09a 0.08a 
EMU 0.48b 0.29b 0.54b 0.294b 0.60b 0.44b 0.21a,b 0.33b 0.10a,b 0.69 
Euclidean Distance 
DE 
Pre-EMU 0.316 0.470 0.394 0.380 0.386 0.494 0.435 0.465 0.509 0.458 
EMU 0.241 0.304 0.195 0.391 0.192 0.246 0.397 0.293 0.371 0.260 
Linear Distance DL 
Pre-EMU 0.316 0.462 0.392 0.380 0.385 0.494 0.427 0.461 0.508 0.458 
EMU 0.241c 0.298 0.191 0.389c 0.191 0.243 0.397c 0.289 0.360 0.244 
Relative Asymmetry 
(vector approach) AE 
Pre-EMU 0.015 -0.911 -0.273 -0.138 -0.204 -0.933 -0.751 -0.837 -0.980 -0.009 
EMU -0.072 -0.282 -0.118 0.312 -0.031 -0.137 0.023 -0.201 -0.531 0.326 
Relative Asymmetry 
(linear approach) AL 
Pre-EMU 0.006d 0.168 -0.061 -0.034 -0.048d 0.032d 0.165 0.120d -0.077d -8e-04d 
EMU -0.038d,e -0.119d -0.073d,e 0.073d,e -0.019d,e -0.071d,e 0.005d,e -0.086d,e -0.175d,e 0.176d,e 
  Notes: EMU starts from 1999:I and ends either in 2011:IV or in 2010:IV depending on data availability.  Letters behind 
figures indicate non-rejection from various statistical tests at the 5% level of risk with successive null hypotheses: a ρs,d=0 
during pre-EMU or EMU, b 23,5 ?@A<BC "  23,5BC, 
c
 D,E?@A<BC "  D,EBC, 
d
 AL=0 during pre-EMU or EMU, e E?@A<BC "
 EBC(10% level of risk). 
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As revealed by the second battery of tests, changes in shock correlation, if any, have resulted 
in weaker asymmetry under EMU than before. The evidence is mixed since major changes 
concern mostly supply shocks, whereas there are rarely significant in terms of demand (except in 
the USA, and in Italy at 10% level).  
Given the third type of test, distance to Germany in terms of shocks comovements has 
improved significantly in most of the countries under study since EMU. Exceptions are Austria, 
Greece, and Portugal. Again, convergence to full symmetry is not specific to the euro area since 
deeper synchronization of macroeconomic shocks seems to have occurred in non-euro countries 
too, as shown in table 2 above.  
Likewise, tests for a substantial gap between correlation coefficients in terms of supply and 
demand are subject to few rejections of the null. Significant departures of the AL index from zero 
are observed in Finland, France, Greece, and Portugal during the pre-EMU period. This holds 
true only in Greece (and the US) thereafter. This is an additional piece of evidence of greater 
homogeneity in terms of shocks within EMU, disregarding the Greek case.  
The latter conclusion is somewhat tempered by the final battery of tests. There are very few 
rejections of a change in the relative strength of asymmetry. These concern Finland and 
Netherlands when the risk level of type-I errors is raised at 10%.
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown how useful information can be extracted from the scatter plot of 
correlation coefficients between macroeconomic shocks arising from the Bayoumi-Eichengreen 
(1993, 1994) approach. In particular, assessing distance to the first-best symmetric monetary 
union and the relative strength of asymmetries crucially depends on the underlying way of 
modeling the welfare loss function. New tests support the idea of a two-speed Europe even since 
EMU. Furthermore shocks have become more symmetric within but also outside the euro area. 
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